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Abstract: 
It has long been theorized that Heidegger’s idea for 
Dasein was highly influenced by the Chinese notion of 
the Dao.  This is due to a misinterpretation on behalf of 
Heideggerian scholars and others of what the Dao repre-
sents.  In fact, Heidegger, in explicating what he thought 
to be “the most extreme inversion of φύσης-ουσία 
[phusis-ousia],” made this equal to “Chinese-like ‘con-
stancy,’” which is the basis of the Dao. Taking what 
Heidegger interpreted phusis to be (derived from Aristote-
lian metaphysics and an assumption of pre-Socratic 
thought) as a process of unconcealment from continuing 
re-concealment which signals a kind of “truth” of being 
[phusis], that which calls for constant presence is inau-
thentic Dasein, rather than authentic Dasein. In other 
words, Heidegger’s idea of what inauthentic Dasein calls 
for could be explained within Aristotle’s system as equal 
to aiming to replace phusis with the know-how of τέχνη 
[techne]. The Dao, as rightfully understood and utilized 
by the master craftsman and the Sage, is accessible, con-
stant, and knowable. This could not be in more opposition 
to Heidegger’s notion of phusis.1 
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1. Introduction 
It has long been theorized that Heidegger’s idea 
for Dasein was highly influenced by the Chinese 
notion of the Dao (May 1999; Parkes 1987). How-
                                                 
1
 M Heidegger (1939) On the being and conception of 
φύσης [phusis] in Aristotle’s Physics B, 1. T Sheehan 
(trans). Man and World 9(3) (August, 1976): 236. 
ever, Heidegger, in explicating what he thought to 
be “the most extreme inversion of φύσης-ουσία 
[phusis-ousia]” (Heidegger 1939, 236), made this 
equal to “Chinese-like ‘constancy,’” which is the 
basis of the Dao. Taking what Heidegger interpreted 
phusis to be (derived from Aristotelian metaphysics 
and an assumption of pre-Socratic thought) as a 
process of unconcealment from continuing re-
concealment which signals a kind of “truth” of being 
[phusis], that which calls for constant presence is 
inauthentic Dasein, rather than authentic Dasein. In 
other words, Heidegger’s idea of what inauthentic 
Dasein calls for could be explained within Aristo-
tle’s system as equal to aiming to replace phusis 
with τέχνη [techne] (phusis here would be associat-
ed with being as originally thought of, by way of 
Heraclitus: “Being loves to hide itself.”).  
If this replacement is done, what phusis is, “the 
origin and ordering of change, such that each thing 
that changes has this ordering within itself” 
(Heidegger 1939, 230), is no longer available; its 
replacement is a constant “know-how in dealing 
with things” (Heidegger 1939, 231) and this know-
how would not be associated with Dasein but rather 
with the outside “they”. Effectively, this would be 
Dasein not being conscious of its possibilities, be-
cause it is the “they” who decide its trajectory. This 
inauthentic Dasein could be seen as calling for the 
constancy of the Dao, for the Dao is defined as the 
stuff and pattern of the universe that is predeter-
mined and knowable to sages and master craftsmen 
alike. One can attain the Dao by having an excellent 
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grasp of its “know-how,” its workings, which could 
be gained through practice and keen awareness of 
the outside natural world. The Being of the Dao is 
thus the constant structure of what is, absent of any 
notion of Being that is conscious of its own possibil-
ities to change (authentic Dasein). 
How did the misconception of connecting 
Heidegger’s system of being with the Dao come 
about? Following Heidegger’s attempt2 to translate 
the Dao de jing道德經, a work attributed to Laozi, 
and one explicit mention of Daoism in one of 
Heidegger’s later writings,3 an overly sentiment-
talized and speculative correlative version has come 
about, one that has been perpetrated by scholars who 
in trying to better understand Heidegger’s notions 
and with a general lack of understanding of the ten-
ets of Daoism have in effect erected an inverted 
“straw man” argument that welds together two dis-
parate notions in order to validate the one. 
It may be that Heidegger had genuinely wanted 
to find some kind of deep connection between Dao-
                                                 
2
 Only a tenth of the relatively small work Dao de jing 
was ever translated into German by Heidegger, and all of 
this was done during the summer of 1946, with the help 
and collaboration of Paul Shih-yi Hsiao. Hsiao had trans-
lated the work into Italian from Classical Chinese, and it 
is from the Italian translation that they then both worked 
off of. From: PS Hsiao (2001) Heidegger and our transla-
tion of the Tao Te Ching. In: R Polt , G Fried (eds) A 
companion to Heidegger’s Introduction to metaphysics. 
Yale University Press, New Haven, London, pp 93–101. 
3 M Heidegger (1959) On the way to language. PD Hertz 
(trans). Harper and Row, New York, 1971, p 92: 
The word "way" probably is an ancient primary word 
that speaks to the reflective mind of man. The key word in 
Laotse's poetic thinking is Tao, which "properly speak-
ing" means way. But because we are prone to think of 
"way" superficially, as a stretch connecting two places, 
our word "way" has all too rashly been considered unfit to 
name what Tao says. Tao is then translated as reason, 
mind, raison, meaning, logos. Yet Tao could be the way 
that gives all ways, the very source of our power to think 
what reason, mind, meaning, logos properly mean to say-
properly, by their proper nature. Perhaps the mystery of 
mysteries of thoughtful Saying conceals itself in the word 
"way," Tao, if only we will let these names return to what 
they leave unspoken, if only we are capable of this, to 
allow them to do so. Perhaps the enigmatic power of 
today's reign of method also, and indeed preeminently, 
stem from the fact that the methods, notwithstanding their 
efficiency, are after all merely the runoff of a great hidden 
stream which moves all things along and makes way for 
everything. All is way. 
Note: The word “Tao” is equivalent to “Dao”. The 
spelling “Tao” comes from an old way of representing 
Chinese phonetics that is no longer generally used. 
ism and his system, hence his brief study of the Dao 
de jing. However, outside of any superficial confab-
ulation, a connection cannot be viably made. Taking 
how Sheehan has represented an inaccurate depic-
tion of Dasein, that Heidegger had rejected (Sheehan 
2001, 270 ft 52), as a further confirmation that Dao-
ism would be an ill-fitted paradigm: 
In the literature this bifurcated view—
Dasein on one side, being on the other—
has generally taken two forms, with their 
apposite narratives…(2) the still popular 
“Big Being” story, according to which Be-
ing Itself, lying hidden somewhere beyond 
our ken, occasionally pulls back the veil 
and reveals Itself to properly disposed hu-
man beings—who in our days are, almost 
exclusively, paid-up Heideggerians 
(Sheehan 2001, 10). 
This description of an inaccurately represented 
Dasein is actually an accurate description of the 
Dao, which is that which is hidden to most, but “re-
veals Itself to properly disposed human beings,” in 
effect a highly exclusionary “being” with regards to 
showing itself, always persistent and pervasive in all 
living and non-living things. 
My aim here is to further demonstrate how the 
Dao is discordant with Heidegger’s notion of au-
thentic Dasein. As implicated in authentic Dasein, 
Heidegger’s notion of phusis is the key to unraveling 
faulty connections to the Dao. This will explicate 
how inauthentic Dasein would actually be a better fit 
to the Daoist tenets of constancy and pervasiveness, 
for inauthentic Dasein seeks and basks in constant 
presence, projecting it when it is not there, even in 
itself. 
Regarding Heidegger’s initial exposure to Dao-
ism, it is possible that he could have read the Daoist 
work Zhuangzi, via a German translation by Buber 
in 1921, before writing Being and Time. However, 
there is no definitive evidence to that effect, either in 
Heidegger’s reading, or application, of any Daoist 
principles in Being and Time. As a result, my analy-
sis here is based off of Heidegger’s thought follow-
ing the so-called “turn” in 1935, with his lecture, as 
put down in Introduction to Metaphysics (Heidegger 
1953 [1935 lecture]). This is also the taking-off 
point of those who connect Heidegger with Daoism, 
and where phusis starts to play an important role. I 
interpret the “turn” in the same way as Sheehan has 
(Sheehan 2001, 13-14), that is that it is not a turn in 
Heidegger’s thought, but rather a functional turn that 
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was manifested in the newly elaborated process of 
the opening up of Dasein. 
 
 
2. The process of opening that is phusis
4
  
Interpreted by Heidegger, phusis is a process of 
coming to presence, and does not name a presence 
or being of any kind. This “emerging-abiding sway” 
(das aufgehend-verweilende Walten), this process of 
disclosure, of unconcealment is described by 
Sheehan as within Heidegger’s system as follows: 
…the being of entities is implicitly some 
form of the presence of entities: not merely 
their presence-to-themselves or their pres-
ence-out-there apart from human beings, 
but their presence to and availability for 
possible human engagement—their hu-
manly specific (“ad hominem”) givenness 
and accessibility. In this implicit phenom-
enological sense, the being of entities is 
their ability to be of concern to human be-
ings, that is, to be significant, understanda-
ble, usable. Thus, in what follows, the term 
“givenness” always means “humanly spe-
cific givenness”… φύσης [phusis] refers to 
the givenness of entities (Sheehan 2001, 
7). 
This phusis, as “givenness”, is not constant, but 
rather a disclosure that is impermanent and unfore-
seeable. It is when the being of entities are open to 
the world that authentic Dasein is possible, and the 
form of the process of this openness is phusis. 
Heidegger viewed phusis as a kind of truth (ἀλήθεια, 
also understood as the state of being evident, and 
unconcealment), not in the sense of correctness or 
propositional thinking, but rather as a process of 
disclosure by which the being of entities “can be-
come manifest or appear in the world” (Guignon 
2001, 52). 
As interpreted by Heidegger, this truth is locat-
ed in the process of disclosure itself and not within 
any being itself. Heidegger was not very clear in 
distinctly explaining how the process of disclosure 
                                                 
4 My focus here is on phusis, rather than Ereignis, to get 
at Heidegger’s original basis for Ereignis that was derived 
from the pre-Socratic and Aristotelian notions of phusis, 
rather than Heidegger’s more developed (for his needs) 
and integrated version of Ereignis. Also, those who con-
nect Heidegger with Daoism usually do so via the notion 
of phusis, and not Ereignis. See: Sheehan (2001), 14, for 
more detail on how “Ereignis was almost—but not 
quite—envisioned by the early Greek thinkers.” 
would be brought about. According to Guignon, this 
process would be as a result of an interplay between 
Dasein and Being, which he associates with “a pre-
vious manifestation of polemos [πόλεμος] that is 
circulating in the world at a particular time” 
(Guignon 2001, 53; Schoenbohm 2001, 151). What 
the process of disclosure would disclose of an entity 
could perhaps be many truths, representing many 
different aspects.  
There is also a sense of a “naming force” that 
the word phusis has, in that the force of language 
and words, and thus according to Heidegger, of 
thought, calls it out as the process of disclosure, of 
process of opening that it is (Scott 2001, 26-28).
5
 
However, what kind of opening is the process of 
phusis concerned with?  
The opening associated with the process of 
phusis is connected to Dasein. According to 
Sheehan: 
For Heidegger the verbal emphasis in 
“Dasein” falls on the second syllable of 
Da-sein, “being the open.” The point is 
that the open is what we “have to be” 
(compare zu-sein). But human beings do 
not “open up the open” by their own sub-
jective powers. Rather, the open is “thrown 
and pulled” open (geworfen/ereignet), 
“drawn out” in such a way that, within the 
opened, the availability of entities occurs. 
This “openedness” is what Jean Beaufret 
had in mind when he interpreted Dasein as 
l’ouverture, and it is the meaning we in-
tend when we render this key term as 
“openness” (Sheehan 2001, 8). 
Phusis names the process by which the opening 
occurs, and it is this which human beings do not 
have control over. In effect, human beings do not 
have control over truth in the world. 
 
2.1 The Dao and phusis 
Before I contrast the Dao with phusis, I provide 
below a brief, relevant summary of how the Dao was 
represented in early Chinese thought.  
The two works of Daoism that Heidegger had 
come across, the Zhuangzi and the Dao de jing hap-
pen to be the most widely known of Daoist works. 
                                                 
5 Scott further claims that “Phusis thus appears in Greek 
language and thought not primarily as something ob-
served in ‘nature’ but as the power of language and 
thought to give things to appear” (Scott 2001, 28). This is 
a highly debatable point that I will not address here. 
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There are other early Chinese works that include 
Daoism as a major influence, such as the Huainanzi, 
but many of these to this day have either not been 
translated or have only had some partial translation. 
This is mainly due to the difficulty of translating 
these works from the original Classical Chinese 
language, which is notoriously frustrating, time con-
suming, and many times, indeterminable.  
Although the representation of the Dao differs a 
little between the Zhuangzi and the Dao de jing, the 
differences are one of degree, rather than “sub-
stance”. In the Zhuangzi, the common man as possi-
ble master craftsman, whether it be as a cook, 
woodmaker, fisherman, or other kind of craftsman, 
has the capability of understanding and embracing 
the Dao (although these occurrences would be rela-
tively rare), while in the Dao de jing, it is only the 
Sage, a rare man of extreme ability that can do so; 
all others do not have this capability and have minor, 
shadowy and totally indeterminable experiences of 
the Dao, and are “condemned” to live an ignorant 
and almost animal-like existence, finding solace in 
creature comforts.  
It is the interpretation of the Dao as shadowy, 
obscure, and unfathomable that is its most famous, 
and usually its only known characteristic, yet this 
interpretation is only reserved for and refers to those 
human beings that have no capability of piercing 
through the Dao to see its true structure. 
The passage below from the Dao de jing exem-
plifies the exclusivity of those who have access to 
the Dao: 
When the man of highest capacities hears 
Dao 
He does his best to put it into practice. 
When the man of middling capacity hears 
Dao 
He is in two minds about it. 
When the man of lowly capacity hears Dao 
He laughs loudly at it (Laozi c2005, 193). 
In the Zhuangzi, nature, with man as an inter-
woven component, is more stressed, while in the 
Dao de jing, the sage, as an extraordinary man, 
seems to be able to rise above all others and above 
ordinary nature to be able to get a kind of birds-eye 
view of things-in-themselves, having the capability 
of peering to a thing’s constant essence to capture it 
for his own use and manipulation. This aspect is 
especially important since it is now understood that 
the Dao de jing was probably written with the idea 
of ruling in mind, as a handbook of how rulers could 
effectively control the masses to avoid uprisings. 
This is a far reach from earlier interpretations from 
Western scholars of the early-to-mid 20
th
 century 
who believed that the writer of the Dao de jing had a 
kind of spiritual gentleness in mind. 
Some characterizations from the Dao de jing of 
what the Dao is comprised of and its nature include: 
“It is from the Nameless that Heaven and Earth 
sprang” (Laozi c2005, 141); “For truly Being and 
Not-being grow out of one another” (Laozi c2005, 
143); “The Way is like an empty vessel that yet may 
be drawn from without ever needing to be filled” 
(Laozi c2005, 146); “Dao never does; yet through it 
all things are done.” (Laozi c2005, 188); and “Dao 
gave birth to the One; the One gave birth successive-
ly to two things, three things, up to ten thousand 
(everything)” (Laozi c2005, 195).”  
Basically, according to the Dao de jing, in the 
beginning of time, something came out of nothing, 
but now there are “somethings”, not nothing, and the 
Dao comprises both the origination point of nothing 
and the “somethings” that now exist. These 
“somethings” are the constant and balanced essences 
of all living and non-living things in the universe 
across time, and also the determinable essences of 
happenings or events (also interpreted as situations) 
through time.  
In this way, by gaining insight of the Dao, either 
the master craftsman (in the Zhuangzi) or the Sage 
(in the Dao de jing) could discover the optimum way 
with which to approach entities and situations. The 
key to be able to do this is the constancy of the es-
sences that are embedded in the Dao. 
A particularly famous passage from the Dao de 
jing is: 
We put thirty spokes together and call it a 
wheel; 
But it is on the space where there is noth-
ing that the 
Usefulness of the wheel depends. 
We turn clay to make a vessel; 
But it is on the space where there is noth-
ing that the 
Usefulness of the vessel depends. 
We pierce doors and windows to make a 
house; 
And it is on these spaces where there is 
nothing that the 
Usefulness of the house depends. 
Therefore just as we take advantage of 
what is, we should 
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Recognize the usefulness of what is not 
(Laozi c2005, 155). 
It is clear that this passage has to do with the re-
lationship of enclosed, contained space to the use-
fulness of what this kind of construction could pro-
duce, and what is not stressed here is the notion of 
an abstract and empty void. Yet, a notion that 
Heidegger had in his essay “The Thing” regarding a 
jug was that “the vessel’s thingness does not lie at 
all in the material of which it consists, but in the 
void that it holds” (Heidegger 1971 [1950 lecture], 
210). Though Heidegger does not mention Daoism 
here whatsoever, arguments have been made that 
this is what he was intimating. However, his view-
point is far from the Daoist spirit of the passage.  
Many of those who associate Heidegger’s con-
cept of being with the Dao make it equivalent to 
Heidegger’s notion of phusis (Pöggeler 1987, 55-
56), while some others connect the Dao with the pre-
Socratic idea of λόγος [logos] (which they then con-
nect to phusis) (Parkes 1987, 106), and still some 
others with Heidegger’s notion of “original nothing” 
(nihil originarium) (Yao 2010, 81; May 1999, 21-
34). 
However, it should now be clear that any of the-
se interpretations would be faulty with regards to the 
Dao. For, the following characteristics of the Dao 
are incompatible with these notions: 1) The Dao 
holds the constant essences of things (while phusis is 
a process of unconcealment, and this is followed by 
concealment, on an ongoing basis); 2) There is no 
early Chinese notion of the Dao as a logos-type “en-
tity”; the Dao is that which is “nameless” (Laozi 
c2005, 141) and prior to language; and 3) by insist-
ing that the Dao is just the “original nothing”, the 
“somethings” (the essences of things and situations) 
that it now contains is completely ignored.  
Additionally, the exclusivity of those rare, ca-
pable few who are able to access the Dao (without 
any effort) is in deep contrast to Heidegger’s con-
cept (and hope and trust) that authentic Dasein 
would be open and available to all those that were 
willing to be open to it, and that the capability (if 
worked and acted upon) of being open to it would be 
available to everyone (though the actual “opening up 
of the open” is not within our human power). 
 
2.2. The Dao and inathentic Dasein 
The connection between inauthentic Dasein and 
the Dao, the “Chinese-like ‘constancy’” I had refer-
enced on the first page, can now be made. Since 
authentic Dasein is that which is open to phusis, the 
process of unconcealment that inevitably leads back 
to concealment (and unconcealment and conceal-
ment again, that cannot be foretold or planned for), 
is not concerned with nor seeks out constant pres-
ence. That which is inauthentic Dasein requires and 
seeks constant presence, thus not being open to the 
process of phusis. Additionally, inauthentic Dasein 
surmises that constant presence always is (including 
within itself), and that it is here-and-there for the 
searching.  
The master craftsman of the Zhuangzi and the 
Sage of the Dao de jing who access the Dao are able 
to do so on a consistent and constant basis. They are 
able to access the Dao because they have exception-
al and rare capabilities of perception to see beyond 
the shadowy veil of the Dao. All those who fall be-
neath this “bar” of capability would not be able to 
access the Dao and would experience it as indeter-
minable and falsely changeable. This system is 
therefore a two-tiered system that is comprised of 
the “Haves” and the “Have-nots”. 
The parallel that can be made here to inauthen-
tic Dasein is that inauthentic Dasein searches and 
believes in constancy, constancy that could accurate-
ly be represented as the Dao. Inauthentic Dasein 
fancies itself to be exceptional. Ironically, this would 
curtail its possibilities since it was not interested in 
change, passing off its power to the “they” who 
would then be in charge of dictating its life. 
 
2.3. Conclusion  
It is a misinterpretation of what the Dao repre-
sents that has driven some Heideggerian scholars 
and others into believing that the Dao could be posi-
tively associated with Heidegger’s conception of 
being. In connecting the “Have-nots” to those who 
have an understanding of the true nature of the Dao, 
they have misconstrued the Dao’s characteristics as 
shadowy, undeterminable, and unstable. Contrary to 
this, the Dao, as rightfully understood by the master 
craftsman and the Sage, is accessible, constant, and 
knowable. This could not be in more opposition to 
Heidegger’s notion of phusis. 
In this way, inauthentic Dasein could be seen to 
be closely aligned with the concept of the Dao. Its 
belief in a structure of constant presence belies the 
notion of authenticity and truth.  
 
3. Epilogue 
It is my hope that in the future more scholarship 
is devoted to clearing up the differences between 
Daoism and Heidegger’s body of work concerning 
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being. What is needed are far more scholars of early 
Chinese philosophy who dare to cross over from 
their discipline into the “wild forests” of continental 
philosophy, in order to get a wider and fuller under-
standing of the world, both past and present. Before 
this happens, the segmentation and limited nature of 
their horizons will undoubtedly keep them rooted, 
passive, and stagnant as they stand. 
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